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SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAw. By Roscoe Pound. The Dartmouth
Alumni Lectures, 1921. Boston: Marshall Jones Company. 1921. Pp.
xv, 224-

The title of this brilliant little volume might, more accurately, have been,
"The Spirits of the Common Law," for it depicts the common law as the
battleground of many conflicting spirits, from which a fe\v relatively permanent ideas and ideals have emerged triumphant. As a whole, the book
is a pluralistic-idealistic interpretation of legal history. Idealistic, because
/
Dean Pound finds that the fundamentals of the common law have been
shaped by ideas and ideals rather than by economic determinism or class
struggle; he definitely rejects a purely economic interpretation of legal history, although he demands a sociological one (pp. 10-n). Pluralistic,
because, unlike those nineteenth-century philosophers who tried to make
legal history stand for the unfolding of a single idea-rational will (Hegel),
popular spirit (Savigny, Puchta)-Dean Pound finds a number of ideas
which have contributed to the spirit of the common law.
The title is reminiscent of two other volumes, one in the eighteenth and
one in the nineteenth century, which are of the same philosophical pedigree:
Montesquieu's "I:Esprit des Lois" and Jhering's "Geist des romischen
Rechts." Montesquieu's book, which antedates Comte, has been called by
Ehrlich "the first attempt to fashion a sociology of law"; his doctrine of
the relativity of law to geographical, ethnical and economic conditions was
at war with the dominant law-of-nature theory of his time. Jhering, though
usually classed as a "social-utilitarian" (Paulsen, a follower, calls it "eudaemonism"), has contributed several important ideas to the program of the
sociological school-among them the conception that "interests" are the
ultimate realities back of "legal rights," the teleological or functional viewpoint in solving legal problems, and the negation of the sufficiency of purely
juristic concepts, logically applied, to satisfy the jural needs of modem
society. These contributions Dean Pound, as a leader of the sociological
school, gracefully acknowledges in the present volume (pp. 203-5).
We must hasten to add, however, that the present volume does not pretend to cover the ground that the other two "Spirits" do. Dean Pound's
immediate task in the present volume is that of presenting to a well-educated
but non-professional audience an understandable picture of our legal institutions. This object he has faithfully adhered to. Whether the well-educated layman will be able to understand the volume in print is another question. Those who have heard Dean Pound lecture on these same topics will
notice many slurrings of detail, many omissions of concrete illustration,
which make his lectures vivid and comprehensible. Those who are familiar
with the author's articles on "Sociological Jurisprudence" will miss the apparatus of foot-notes in which he is wont to overwhelm the reader with the
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wealth and variety of his citations. There is not a single foot-note in the
present volume. Obviously, a book for laymen!
Yet the lawyer will find many stimulative ideas crowded into these two
hundred pages-ideas which will help him to solve the first problem at the
office tomorrow morning, for Dean Pound has the rare virtue, for a legal
philosopher, of always keeping his feet on the ground. Take, for instance,
the feudal notion of "relation," which the author seems to have· rescued
from the limbo of nineteenth-century jurisprudence. Under the feudal system,
the relation between lord and man was one of reciprocal rights and duties
(p. 20) which were defined by the law, once it was found that the relation
existed. This, the author says, became the typical common-law method of
dealing with legal problems. In the nineteenth century it was crowded
aside by the individualistic conception of contract (legal transaction), borrowed from the Roman law (modern), by which it was sought to derive
all legal consequences of a given human relation from the manifestations
of the wills of the parties voluntarily entering thereinto.
•
Thus, viewed as an attempt to coerce the wills of employer and employee
into making a certain contract involving fundamental changes in their reciprocal rights and duties, as previously interpreted, a Workmen's Compensation Act is an arbitrary and officious interference with individual liberty.
But viewed as an exercise of the time-honored prerogative of lawmakers
to alter and prescribe the legal incidents of the relation of master and servant in such a way as to secure weighty social as well as individual interests, such a statute is in harmony with the spirit of the common law (pp.
29, 30). More recent still are statutes regulating the incidents of the relation of landlord and tenant, which was the basic relation of the feudal
system (p. 22). By judicial decisions, chiefly, the relation of carrier and
-passenger has been regulated with a minuteness of detail which no theory
of free-willing contractors can adequately explain. The relation of parent
and child, for centuries almost untouched by law, has recently been regulated by juvenile court legislation. Thus, to a surprising degree, "relation"
explains recent legal developments as in harmony with the spirit of the
common law.
The conception of a legal transaction (contract, in the broadest sense)
"regards individuals only. In the pioneer agricultural societies of nineteenth-century America such a conception sufficed. In the industrial and
urban society of today classes and groups and relations must be taken
account of no less than. individuals" (p. JI). "Relation" is a more concrete,
more human concept than our bloodless conception of contract, which,
as Ehrlich has pointed out, does not describe the interest to be protected,
but merely designates the conditions under which the claim to legal protection arises. In this respect, moreover, the "relation" of the common law
is to be distinguished from the abstract metaphysical "jural relations" which
Professor Kocourek (starting from Saviguy) has written about lately, and
from the analytical "legal relations" which Professor Corbin advocates.
The former (the "relation" of the common law) is a species of concrete

BOOK REVIEWS

8n

human association, contrasted with such legal categories as contract and
pure tort; the latter are generic categories embracing all phases of human
conduct having legal consequences, including contract and tort. The legal
consequences of the one are derived from a consideration of the interests
involved in the particular relation, by a process largely intuitive; the legal
consequences of the other are derived by a priori reasoning from the abstract
nature of the concept. The latter is a logical conception; the former may
be called, for lack of a better word, a sociological conception.
Dean Pound is not unaware of some of the disadvantages of the common-Jaw relation. In the first place, it leads to a certain narrowness in the
field of tort-liability; the judges tend to exclude liability with undue strictness where no "relation" is involved (p. 24). The passenger in the Pullman, for example, is entitled to the highest degree of care, but the tramp
on the "blind baggage" is scarcely regarded as a human being. Again, the
amplification of the incidents of a particular relation is apt to develop a
sort of "law-of-nature," in which fanciful duties and over-refined standards
of conduct are imposed. The fiduciary relations of equity (p. 25) have
sometimes been over-refined. The law of mortgagor and mortgagee and of
carrier and passenger might be drawn upon for further examples. Thirdly,
while, as Dean Pound points out (p. 30), relation is to be distinguished
from "status," or the capacity for legal rights and duties (infancy, coverture, slavery), yet is it not conceivable that the sum-total of the disabilities
incident to a series of relations may be but little short of those imposed by
an inferior status?
Of the eight essays, the one on "Puritanism and the Law" is the least
convmcmg. Religious interpretations of legal history are apt not to be
satisfactory, as the author realizes. At first we are told that the Puritan
insisted upon a maximum of individual liberty, and, as a corollary thereto,
desired a minimum of legislation (p. 46). Yet the Puri~an, both in England
and New England, was a prolific legislator (p. 47). Dean Pound endeavors
to reconcile these two statements by saying that the Puritans believed in
instructio1i through legislation (p. 47), in a multitude of rules with no adequate provision for carrying them into effect (p. 56). It seems too much
to say that the "blue laws" were merely meant to be advisory. Weakness
of law enforcement is a common American trait, not less conspicuous in
the non-Puritan South than in Puritan New England. At all events, the
author's indictment of Puritanism makes interesting reading.
In "The Pioneers and the Law" Dean Pound departs from his dazzling
manipulation of ideas to give us a sociological' interpretation of the formative period of American legal history. Here are depicted with bold, sure
strokes the social factors of the period l8oo-1860 which made for intense
individualism in our legal and political philosophy and for certain archaic
features in state judicial organization (pp. 121-2), for our "sporting theory"
of judicial procedure (p. 125) and for many features of our slow and creaky
machinery of criminal justice (p. 123).
The ·final chapter, deceptively entitled "Legal Reason," deals with the
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stage of legal development upon which we are now entering: the "socialization of the law," in which legal philosophy is once more to come into its
own (p. 149). The author takes pains to assure the timid reader that "socialization" does not mean "socialism" (p. 195). Here we are given a taste-but only a taste--of the methods and concrete results 0£ sociological jurisprudence. Without attempting to define "interest" (Bentham gave it up
nearly a century and a half ago), yet paraphrasing it carefully as "claim,"
"demand," "want," Dean Pound says, cautiously, that "at least" six groups
of social interests may be enumerated as "involved in the existence of civilized society" (p. 2o8). Thus, the author's scheme of social interests is not
a closed system; he does not purport to have discovered (as many legal
philosophers before him have done) all the philosophical premises or criteria
of a legal system.
The six groups of social interests are:
"the general security, the claim
or want of civilized society to be secure from those acts or courses of conduct that threaten its existence," which includes "peace and order," "the
general health," "the security of acquisitions" and "the security of transactions"; 2, "the security of social institutions," "domestic, religious and political"; 3, "the conservation of social resources," which seems to include natural resources, whether privately owned or not; 4, "the general morals, the
claim or want of civilized society to be secure against those acts and courses
of conduct which run counter to the moral sentiment of the general body
of those who live therein for the time being." It is not clear that this group
may not be distributed under the other groups; but it is perhaps worth while,
pragmatically, to catalogue separately the demand that law shall not be out
of harmony with popular sentiments generally. The author has elsewhere
indicated that not all moral principles are to be turned into legal rules (pp.
43-44) ; 5, "general progress," "economic, political and cultural." This group
must remain some"'.hat nebulous until the social scientists or the philosophers give us a definition of "progress." Dean Pound probably means to
include such things as freedom of speech and of scientific research; 6, "the
social interest in the individual human life, the claim or want of civilized
soeiety that each individual therein be able to live a human life according
to the standards of the society." This interest is different from the individual's interest in his own life. It would seem to postulate the general
prevalence of an altruistic social philosophy.
Individual interests are not included in this enumeration; apparently
they are to be secured only in so far as they may happen to coincide with
or run parallel to a social interest (p. 203). This subordination of individual interests is fundamentally opposed to the conclusion reached by all
the dominant nineteenth-century schools of legal philosophy, since each of
these, whatever its pn;mises, finally arrived at the view that the object of
law was to secure a maximum of individual self-assertion (p. 151).
Dean Pound gives a number of examples in which he contrasts the
nineteenth-century way of looking at specific legal problems with the method
of sociological jurisprudence (pp. 196-203). The method advocated is the
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balancing of interests. "The criterion actually employed is the one proposed by William James as a principle of ethical philosophy-'since all
demands conjointly cannot be satisfied in this poor world,' our aim should
be 'to satisfy as many as we can with the least sacrifice of other demands'"
(p. 199). This method seems essentially the same as that advocated by
two leading Continental writers of the sociological school, Ehrlich and Kantorowicz. Dean Pound adopts the pragmatic ethics. But pragmatism is
eclectic, a method rather than a system of philosophy. How are we to know
which interests to protect and which to sacrifice? Surely it is not to be
determined by a mathematical formula; we cannot count interests as we
count votes, and adopt that solution of a problem which has a numerical
majority of interests in its favor. The author here appears to rely upon
Kohler's "jural postulates of civilization" (p. 82), for he emphasizes frequently "the existence of civilized society" as the fundamental thing to be
protected (pp. 2o8, 201). Perhaps it is a virtue rather than a defect of
sociological jurisprudence that it has no definite philosophical premises, no
1¥eltanscltaumtg. In many of the examples given by Dean Pound the solution, once we catalogue the interests involved, will appear fairly certain,
whatever one's social philosophy may be. For the more doubtful cases, the
sociological jurist is in a position to accept the conclusions of sociologists,
if they have any.
So far as the present volume goes, the method put forth is that of balancing interests by intuition or on the basis of casual observation. Obviously,
in balancing interests we are not to consider merely the individual case, but
to treat it in terms of universal principles. The social interest in Jean Val
Jean's existence must be secured in some other way than by sacrificing the
universal social interest in the security of acquisitions as represented in the
ownership of the loaf of bread. Yet even so, the method, if it is to be
used as an instrument of constructive advancement rather than as an explanation of what has already happened, seems too subjective in its present
shape to be an enduring criterion of legal rules and doctrines in a scientific
age. The program of the sociological school includes a more exact plan of
progress through cooperation between jurists and social scientists, whereby
the former ·will adopt the scientific conclusions of the latter. How is this
plan to be worked out? Where are we to get the trained investigators to
carry out this program, and how are their results to be made available to
the judge, the lawyer, and the legislator? Must the law lag behind until
the sociologists' conclusions become axiomatic, or may we allow an elective
judiciary, making, finding, interpreting, and applying the law by the method
of judicial empiricism (Chapter VII), to balance social interests by the
method of casual observation?
These and many other problems the author leaves unsolved. Ten years
have passed since Dean Pound annoum;ed his treatise on sociological jurisprudence. The present volume-brilliant, erudite, stimulating, though it isis not a fulfillment of that promise, which is yet to be redeemed.
State University of Iowa, College of Law.
EDWIN W. PA'!"l'ERSON.
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Tm: Hrs'l'ORY oF CONSPIRACY AND .ABUSE oF LEGAL PROCEDURE. By Pe~cy H.
'II/infield. Cambridge: The University Press. 1921. Pp. xxvii, 219.
This is the first volume of a series to be issued under the general title,
Cambridge Studies in English Legal History, edited by Harold D. Hazeltine,
Downing Professor of the Laws of England in the University of Cambridge.
The series will include two kinds of studies, monographs and editions of
texts, this being the first of the monographs. The editor e..'Cpresses the hope
that two volumes a year may be is.sued.
A reading of the present volume confirms the editor's foreword that the
work consolidates the results of years of painstaking, skilful and learned
research. No statement in it goes unsupported by careful reference notes,
so that a great wealth of original material has been collected and marshalled
in the most available form.
The subject is one which carries the reader into unfamiliar fields, for
it has never before been carefully investigated; but while many of the forms
of abuse of legal procedure which the book discusses are no longer of practical importance, they present a most fascinating and dramatic picture o;
the long struggle of society to prevent legal institutions from playing into
the hands of oppressors. We complain of our courts and their processes as
slow, needlessly technical and lacking in operative efficiency, and we often _
feel that these qualities give wealthy suitors an indirect advantage over
others, but we do not observe any widespread tendency on the part of predatory individuals or classes to deliberately employ the machinery of the
courts for inflicting unlawful injury or obtaining unlawful advantages.
Outside of the highly controversial question of injunctive relief in labor
disputes, and barring epidemics of police persecution, the resort to the courts
is generally conceded to be legitimate. Purely oppressive use of legal processes is comparatively rare.
But this was not always true, as the book under review amply proves.
One is amazed at the panorama which the author presents of conspiracies
confederacies, maintenance, false accusations, frivolous and vexatious litigation, champerty, embracery, barratry and malicious arrests. His chief
interest is the scope and development of the remedies for these abuses.
The great remedy, the writ of conspiracy, he believes did not exist at common law, but originated in the Statute of Conspiritors in zo and 21 Edward
I. It was usually employed in cases of false accusations of crime, but it
was sometimes brought "against land-grabbers who would snatch with the
law's hands that form of property which then epitomized wealth and power."
"The story of what justifies conspiracy in its old sense is the story of a
long struggle to solve the legal puzzle of punishing the rogue who would
kill and rob with the law's own weapons without at the same time terrifying
the honest accuser or plaintiff." "The law at times seems to barricade its
windows against light and air, and to leave its doors unlocked to rascals."
Eventually the writ, like most of those in the ancient register, became too
rigid and gave place to the action on the case in the nature of conspiracy.
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Punishment for conspiracy was savagely severe, but "crime was rife in
high places." "In 1330 a sweeping provision of the King and Council
requires all the sheriffs of England to be removed and not to be received
back, and good people and sages of the law to be assigned throughout all
England to inquire, hear and determine, at the suit of both King and party,
conspiracies, oppressions, grievances and trespasses made between 1 Edward
II and 4 Edward III by sheriffs, coroners, constables, bailiffs, hundredors
and such other ministers and others." The judgment was that they should
not thereafter be put on juries, that their lands, goods and chattels should
be seized by the King, that their trees should be uprooted and their bodies
imprisoned. Sometimes the punishment was by branding in the face and
slitting the nose, and sometimes by loss of ears, pillory, whipping and fine.
But the writ of conspiracy was itself perverted, and although it was designed
to stop false accusations it became a means for stifling honest ones. The
ordinary courts proved inadequate to cope with the evil, and only with the
establishment of the Star Chamber was the crime .of conspiracy "withered
at its root."
Maintenance and champerty are traced through the early records in the
same way. Coke believed that they were offenses at common law, but the
author doubts this. Statutes began to be enacted in 3 Edward I, and were
at first directed against the King's officers on account of the corruption so
common among them. Maintainers and barrators became a universal pest,
and "king after king tried to extirpate them, but never wholly succeeded."
"At one moment the King, his Council and Parliament are giving remedies
against these offences. At the next he and they are committing them."
"Champerty and maintenance were wide spread over the kingdom, but at·
times were so virulent in particular districts as to call for special measures."
Here again the Star Cha,mber proved the salvation of the people from the
threatened deluge of corruption.
The history of the punishments for these and similar offenses against
legal procedure casts a particularly interesting light upon our own problem
of punishment for crime. The author points out that "wherever we find in
the mediaeval statute-book a batch of exceptionally harsh statutes, we can
nearly always infer that there were at that period a feeble or absentee King
and a lawless baronage. It is a mark of such times that the punishments
for many of the worst crimes against public order are in theory tremendous,
and that the laws which fix them are little more than a dead letter owing
to the venality or weakness of those charged with their execution." We
would show a truer historical understanding if, instead of advocating heavier
penalties for crime, we made the administration of the criminal law more
swift and sure.
The book is prepared with such conscientious precision that the author
seems deliberately to abstain from a natural inclination toward the imaginative and picturesque allusions and side-lights which so often grace the pages
of Pollock and Maitland. But while requiring close reading it is by no
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means dull, and is undoubtedly a contribution of the highest importance in
its field. Such a volume is a positive inspiration to the reader of legal history, who so often has to choose between stupid thoroughness and lively
superficiality.
EDSON R. SUNDERLAND.

GoVERN:MENTAL CONTROL AND OPERATION OF INDUSTRY IN GREAT BRITAIN AND
THE UNITED STATES DURING THE vVoRLD WAR. By Charles Whiting
Baker. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. New York:
Oxford University Press. 1921. Pp. vii, 138.
On the whole, Mr. Baker's book is a defense of the government's control of industry during the war. Perhaps we are not far enough removed
from the events to expect an entirely impartial discussion of such a controversial question. Some students, however, have more nearly approximated
this desirable end. The tone of the book is generally temperate and the
author is not insensible to the faults of government administration, but
there is an evident tendency to subordinate these faults. Most fair-minded
people will probably agree with the author that, looking at the broad results
attained and bearing in mind the immensity of the problems and the urgency
of immediate decisions, the records of government administration in Great
Britain and the United States were as good as could have been reasonably
expected. This is the author's thesis and is as well supported as it could
be in the brief space of 138 pages. The reviewer wonders, however, if Mr.
Baker has not exaggerated the opposition to his own views in asserting that
the conservative middle classes "are well-nigh unanimous in condemnation
of the way the government business was carried on." Does not the sentiment shown in the demand for a return of the raifroads to private ownership and for the sale of our government-owned merchant marine to private
operators merely indicate a belief that the necessities of war-time. and wise
policy in peace-time call for quite different programs? One feels in reading
the book that the author is rather missing the point of the present popular
disapproval of government control of business.
The book is valuable as a summary statement of the development and
conduct of government control over industry during the war. There is a
brief and interesting chapter on the nature of efficiency and on the difficulty
of its attainment by a government. The author then proceeds seriatim
through a discussion of government control of railways, public utilities,
shipping, labor, capital, food, and fuel, and concludes with very brief chapters on the extension of government control in peace-time and the conflict
between the executive and legislative branches of government. For the general reader, perhaps, the value of the book is enhanced by the omission of
many details which would be desired by the more serious student.
For the student who is interested in government administration during
this period, not so much for its own sake as for the principles of adminis-

BOOK REVIEWS
tration which it may yield and for the light which it may throw on the
normal peace-time relation of the state to industry, the book will be less
satisfying. Without criticising the author for writing a book with another
purpose, it may be suggested that what is now needed is a study of government administration of war activities in general from this latter point of
view-a book undertaken in a sympathetic mood, giving full credit to the
men who gave their best efforts to the successful prosecution of the war,
but concerned primarily with distinguishing between the principles of administration which were shown to be valid and those which were shown to be
fundamentally unsound.
University of Michigan.
C. E. GRn'.FIN.
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